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Abstract
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The food commodity price increases beginning in 2001 
and culminating in the food crisis of 2007/08 reflected 
a combination of several factors, including economic 
growth, biofuel expansion, exchange rate fluctuations, 
and energy price inflation. To quantify these influences, 
the authors developed an empirical model that also 
included crop inventory adjustments. The study shows 
that, if inventory effects are not taken into account, the 
impacts of the various factors on food commodity price 
inflation would be overestimated. If the analysis ignores 
crop inventory adjustments, it indicates that prices of 
corn, soybean, rapeseed, rice, and wheat would have 
This paper is a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at gtimilsina@worldbank.org.  
been, respectively, 42, 38, 52, and 45 percent lower than 
the corresponding observed prices in 2007. If inventories 
are properly taken into account, the contributions of 
the above mentioned factors to those commodity prices 
are 36, 26, 26, and 35 percent, respectively. Those 
four factors, taken together, explain 70 percent of the 
price increase for corn, 55 percent for soybean, 54 
percent for wheat, and 47 percent for rice during the 
2001–2007 period. Other factors, such as speculation, 
trade policy, and weather shocks, which are not included 
in the analysis, might be responsible for the remaining 
contribution to the food commodity price increases. 
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Food and fuel commodity prices, which had been rising since 2001 (see Figures 1 and 2), 
reached record levels by mid-2008 [21, 52, 65]. According to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) primary commodity price database, world food commodity prices increased 100% or 
more from 2001 to 2008 (in 2005 US $), with prices increasing by almost 300% for rice (see 
table inset in Figure 2).  
The period between 2001 and 2008 was also the period during which production of biofuels 
such as ethanol and biodiesel produced from food crops grew several fold. During this time, 
global ethanol production from maize and sugarcane more than doubled from 30 billion liters 
to 65 billion liters, while biodiesel production from edible oil seeds such as soybean, oil palm, 
and rapeseed expanded six fold from 2 billion liters to 12 billion liters [46]. The increase in 
biofuel demand, which was concentrated in the United States and the European Union (EU), 
was primarily a response to government mandates and subsidies.
1 This has led to the popular 
opinion that biofuel policies in the high-income countries are one of the principal causes for the 
inflation in food commodity prices.  
Biofuels reduce demand for oil and increase demand for agricultural goods.
2 With crops 
comprising a small share of the final cost of food in high -income countries, the impact of 
biofuels on food consumers is small. To low -income countries, where expenditure on raw 
grains and vegetable oils comprises a much larger share of the household food budget, a given 
increase in crop prices will have a much larger impact on food consumers.  
This paper aims to identify the main factors affecting food commodity prices, and to also 
quantify the contributions of these factors. A distinguishing feature of our analysis is taking 
into account adjustments in inventories of agricul tural goods in response to these various 
factors. Although conceptually an important component of food commodity markets, to the 
best of our knowledge, it is not explicitly incorporated into existing empirical/computational 
models. 
                                                 
1Growth in domestic biofuel demand in Brazil, a large biofuel producer, also increased, but was less significant relative to 
growth in demand in the U.S. and EU countries. 
2Biofuels reduce the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) market power, and therefore reduce energy 
prices [32,33]. 3 
 
 
Figure 1. Commodity price trends (Source: [65]) 
  
Figure 2. Crop price trends  
Inventory levels, and their relation to consumption as captured by stock to use, played an 
important role in the 2007/08 food commodity spike. By 2008, the stock-to-use ratio declined 
to  historical  lows,  as  did  inventory  levels.  This  was  the  outcome  of  successive  years  of 
consumption exceeding production, which can be traced all the way back to 1985 [66]. The 
decline in inventory to historical lows resulted in commodity prices being more sensitive to any 
given shock.  
Along with biofuel expansion, the period between 2001 and 2007 also witnessed high global 
economic growth, energy price inflation, and exchange rate fluctuations, among other factors. 
These factors also can contribute to food price increases. The rapid economic growth resulted 
in increased demand for meat products, which, on per calorie delivered basis, are more grain 
intensive than nonmeat products. Other demand side factors included expansion of biofuels 
and population growth, as well as speculative activity [59]. On the supply side, some of the 
major factors included bad weather in key grain-producing regions (especially wheat-growing 
regions such as the United States and EU) and increase in production costs (due to high energy 
prices – [60]). When extending the empirical period investigated, the supply factors would also 
2001￿ 2002￿ 2003￿ 2004￿ 2005￿ 2006￿ 2007￿ 2008￿
corn￿ 89.6￿ 99.3￿ 105.1￿ 111.9￿ 98.4￿ 121.1￿ 162.7￿ 223.1￿
soybean￿ 180.7￿ 201.3￿ 241.3￿ 288.5￿ 238.6￿ 234.8￿ 326.9￿ 474.7￿
rapeseed￿ 206.1￿ 221.8￿ 265.9￿ 304.7￿ 260.1￿ 313.3￿ 427.3￿ 604.9￿
rice￿ 177.4￿ 196.9￿ 200.9￿ 244.5￿ 290.5￿ 311.2￿ 334.5￿ 697.5￿













































include stagnation of productivity growth due to cumulative underinvestment in agricultural 
research and technology, as well as infrastructure such as irrigation [5, 10]. All these supply 
factors resulted in slow or negative growth in production [2, 3, 21, 66]. Some factors affect 
both demand and supply. These factors include trade policies such as export bans on grains 
(especially the ban on rice exports by several countries in Asia, such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, 
and India [23])
3 and import tariffs on non-grain biofuels (especially the U.S. import tariffs on 
cane ethanol from Brazil, but also on rice in Indonesia [64]). The depreciation of the U.S. dollar 
relative to major world currencies has also been a contributing factor to commodity price 
increases [2,59], as were energy prices [33].  
The rest of the report is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a review of the literature 
on recent increase in food commodity prices and the effect of biofuels on food commodity 
prices. We briefly survey historical trends in section 3. Following this, the effect of introducing 
an empirical model of inventory into the partial equilibrium model is also illustrated in section 
4. In section 5 we extend the partial -equilibrium analysis to a multi -market multi-region 
framework. Section 6 describes the results from the numerical simulation of the multi-market 
model. This section demonstrates the importance of understanding the market for inventory to 
better predict the effect of any large supply or demand shock on commodity prices. Section 7 
concludes the report.  
2. Literature review 
Economic equilibrium models have a long tradition of use for predicting the effects of one or 
more policies on prices, welfare, and a variety of other economic variables [19]. These models 
can be classified as partial and general equilibrium models. Partial equilibrium models are 
essentially the aggregation of supply and demand equations that represent economic behavior 
of agents in one or more markets of interest. Examples of prominent partial equilibrium models 
include IMPACT, AGLINK/COSIMO, FAPRI, and FASOM.   
The  International  Model  for  Policy  Analysis  of  Agricultural  Commodities  and  Trade 
(IMPACT) is a partial-equilibrium model that has often been used by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) for projecting global food supply, food demand, and food 
security to 2020 and beyond. Using this model, Msangi et al. simulate the impact of biofuel 
under different scenarios on the price of food in different regions [48]. In one of the scenarios, 
                                                 
3For a comprehensive list, see the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) summary on policy measures taken by 
governments to reduce the impact of soaring prices http://www.fao.org/giews/english/policy/2.htm. Also 
seeftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/i0854e/i0854e04.pdf 5 
 
which focused on rapid global growth in biofuel production under conventional conversion 
technologies, the price increase for major crops ranges between 30% and 76% by 2020. There 
is significant increase in malnutrition in many developing country regions with Sub-Saharan 
Africa being the hardest hit. Using the AGLINK and COSIMO models, the OECD predicts the 
impact of achieving the stated policy targets (as of 2006) for biofuels in several countries [42]. 
It finds that compared to a situation with unchanged biofuel quantities at their 2004 levels, crop 
prices could increase by between 2% in the case of oilseeds and almost 60% in the case of sugar 
by the year 2014.  
Partial models have several limitations, such as lack of acknowledgement of the finiteness of 
resources such as land, labor, and capital; no explicit budget constraint on households; and no 
check on conceptual and computation consistency of the model [30]. These limitations can be 
overcome by using a general equilibrium approach. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
modeling is a numerical technique that combines the theoretical framework of Walrasian 
general equilibrium formalized by Arrow and Debreu [6] with real world economic data to 
determine the levels of supply, demand, and price that support equilibrium across a specified 
set of markets [69]. These models, which were initially developed to analyze the impact of 
changes in trade policies and public finance, have subsequently found wide application in the 
analysis of relationship between energy and the macro economy, the impact of greenhouse gas 
policies, and most recently in the context of biofuel policies [10, 13, 31]. GTAP, LINKAGE, 
and  USAGE  are  some  prominent  general  equilibrium  models  that  were  used  to  analyze 
biofuels.
4  
Dixon, Osborne, and Rimmer [18] use a dynamic CGE model called USAGE to quantify the 
economy wide effects of partial replacement of crude petroleum with biofuels in the United 
States. They forecast the impact of the current biofuel  policies on the U.S. economy in 2020 
[18]. Although there is no direct discussion of the impact of these policies on the global price of 
food, the model predicts a reduction in agricultural exports and an increase in the export prices. 
Gohin and Moschini assess the impacts of the European indicative biofuel policy on the EU 
farm sector with a farm-detailed CGE model and predict positive income effects on farmers in 
the EU [26]. Birur, Hertel, and Tyner use the GTAP-E model to study the impact of six drivers 
of the biofuel boom, namely, the hike in crude oil prices, replacement of methyl tertiary butyl 
ether (MTBE) by ethanol as a gasoline additive in the United States, and subsidies for ethanol 
                                                 
4 GTAP – model developed at Purdue University; LINKAGE – The World Bank’s model, and USAGE – model developed at 
Monash University, Australia. 6 
 
and biodiesel in the United States and EU [12]. They find that between 2001 and 2006 these 
drivers were responsible for a 9% increase in the price of U.S. coarse grains, 10% increase in 
price of oilseeds in the EU-27 region, and 11% for sugarcane in Brazil. Similar impacts were 
observed on energy-exporting countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The main 
drawbacks of a CGE model are the large data requirements and the high degree of complexity.  
The food crisis of 2007-08 has spawned a large body of literature examining the causes for the 
spike in food commodity prices. Interest in the food crisis can be motivated by the impact of an 
increase in food commodity prices on food-insecure and poor households, which is substantial 
[67]. De Hoyos and Medvedev use domestic food consumer price data to show that the 5.6% 
increase in average food commodity price between January 2005 and December 2007 implied 
a 1.7 percentage point increase in the extreme poverty headcount at the global level, with 
significant regional variation [16] (see also Ivanic and Martin [39]). Nearly all of the increase 
in extreme poverty is reported to occur in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, 
Regmi et al. show that when faced with higher food commodity prices, the poor switch to foods 
that have lower nutritional value and lack important micronutrients [57].  
Although the IMF Global Food Index during the 12 months preceding March 2008 increased 
43%, the U.S. food Consumer Price Index increased only 4.5%. The global food price index 
assigns greater weight to raw grains unlike the U.S. food Consumer Price Index where the 
basket places greater weight on processed foods. The reason for the smaller increase in food 
commodity prices is that Americans tend to consume highly processed foods. When U.S. 
consumers  purchase  foods  from  supermarkets,  convenience  stores,  or  restaurants,  a  large 
fraction goes to cover labor associated with preparing, serving, and marketing the food.
5 
Similar patterns are observed in other developed countries. This is not the case in developing 
countries. The poor spend a larger fraction of their income on food, whereas the typical 
American spends slightly less than 14% of total expenditures on food.
6 In contrast, Africans 
spend 43% of their expenditures on food,
7 and those subsisting on less than one dollar per day 
in Sub-Saharan Africa may dedicate as much as 70% of their expenditures to food.
8  
We need a statement that the global food index assigns greater weight to raw grains unlike the 
U.S. CPI where the basket is processed foods. And we should refer to rich nations in general 
                                                 
5USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmToConsumer/Data/marketingbilltable1.htm 
6U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2006. 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ce/share/2006/income.txt. Typical American refers to an individual at the median income 
level. 
7Federal Reserve Board Staff calculation, IMF, and World Bank. 
8The International Food Policy Research Institute 2020 Discussion Paper No. 43, “The World’s Most Deprived.” 7 
 
rather than just the U.S.  
Global (food) commodity price inflation equaled 43% during the 12 months ending on March, 
2008. While this rate is high, it is not unprecedented. Similar increases in (food) commodity 
prices were observed between 1971 and 1974 and between 1994 and 1996 [52]. While biofuels 
were unique to the recent crisis, other (important) factors were common to one or both crises. 
Furthermore, each of the three periods of peak prices has been marked by a below-normal ratio 
of  stocks  to  use.  An  IMF  report  assessing  the  impact  of  rise  in  food  and  fuel  price  on 
macroeconomic indicators such as balance of payments, overall inflation, and poverty also 
concludes that biofuels are one among several factors, which coincided to cause the food 
commodity price inflation [38]. This report also contends that restrictive trade policies were the 
major reason for the run-up in the price of rice.  
Table 1. Quantitative estimates of impact of biofuel on food commodity prices 
 
Source    Estimate   Commodity   Time period    
Mitchell [47]   75%   global food index   Jan 2002 to Feb 2008   
IFPRI [59]   39%   corn   2000 to 2007   
  21-22%   rice and wheat   2000 to 2007   
OECD-FAO [51]   42%   coarse grains   2008 to 2017   
  34%   vegetable oils   2008 to 2017   
  24%   wheat   2008 to 2017   
Collins [15]   25-60%   corn   2006 to 2008   
  19-26%   U.S. retail food   2006 to 2008   
Glauber [25]   23-31%   commodities   Apr 2007 to Apr 2008   
  10%   global food index   Apr 2007 to Apr 2008   
  4-5%   U.S. retail food   Jan to April 2008   
CEA [42]   35%   corn   Mar 2007 to Mar 2008   
  3%   global food index   Mar 2007 to Mar 2008   
Rajagopal et al. [54]   15-28%   global corn price   2007 to 2008   
  10-20%   global soy price   2007 to 2008   
Hoyos and 
Medvedev[16]  
6%   global food index   2005 to 2007   
 
Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner, through a review of several reports on the food crisis, conclude that 
there are several key drivers of food commodity price increases: the depreciation of the dollar, 
global changes in production such as weather shocks, changes in patterns of food consumption, 
and the role of biofuels in commodity price increases [2]. They do not, however, present 
quantitative estimates of percentage contribution to the total price rise that is attributable to a 
specific factor such as biofuel consumption. The FAO in its State of Food and Agriculture 2008 
Report also states that growing demand for biofuels is only among several factors driving 8 
 
increases in agricultural commodity prices [21]. A USDA report describing the factors leading 
to the food commodity price rise concludes that the run- up in commodity price reflects a trend 
of slower growth in production and more rapid growth in demand that led to a tightening of 
world balances of grains and oilseeds over the last decade [66].  
Biofuels  are  considered  to  be  one  among  several  demand-side  and  supply-side  factors 
responsible for the increase in crop and food commodity prices in recent years [15, 21, 25, 43, 
47, 51, 59]. Quantitative estimates of the impact of biofuels on grain prices range from 20% to 
60% (see Table 1). The most pessimistic estimate ascribed 70 to 75% of the price rise between 
2002 and 2008 to biofuels [47]. This report uses historical data to estimate the elasticity of 
world prices of agricultural commodities with respect to the price of energy and related inputs 
to agriculture and with respect to changes in the value of the dollar. Using these elasticities, this 
report estimates that between 2002 and 2007, higher prices of energy increased export prices of 
major U.S. food commodities by about 15 to 20 percentage points, and the depreciating dollar 
increased food commodity prices by about 20 percentage points. These together, it is argued, 
translate into a 25 to 30% increase in total price. The author argues that depletion of stocks, 
shifting for food cropland for production of energy crops, government response in the form of 
food export bans, and speculative activity, which caused prices to rise, were the consequences 
of the shocks considered with demand for biofuels being the main cause.  
Rosegrant  estimates  the  effect  of  biofuels  using  a  simulation-based  approach  [59].  He 
simulates the market equilibrium under two different scenarios, one without high growth in 
biofuel and another with high growth in biofuel. For the former, he simulates a scenario in 
which biofuel grows at a rate which was observed between 1990 and 2000. This is the period 
before the rapid takeoff in demand for bioethanol. For the latter, he simulates actual demand for 
food crops as a feedstock for biofuel, from the years 2001 through 2007. Based on these 
simulations, he estimates that weighted average grain price increased by an additional 30% 
under the high biofuel scenario, i.e., the actual situation. The increase was highest for maize 
(39%) and lower for wheat and rice (22% and 21%, respectively). Using a similar approach, 
Rajagopal et al. estimate that U.S. ethanol production in 2007 may have been responsible for a 
15% to 28% increase in the world price of maize and 10% to 20% increase in the world price of 
soy [54].  
Global estimates of both the increase in food commodity prices and the contribution of biofuels 
to this increase hide variations at the regional level. Mabison and Weatherspoon argue that in 
South  Africa  food  is  processed  and  then  transported  several  miles  before  it  reaches  the 9 
 
consumer [44]. Thus, a large percentage of the price of food is a result of high fuel costs, which 
may not be true in other regions in the world. Increase in energy prices was therefore a major 
contributor to the increase in food commodity price in those regions. Yang, Zhou, and Liu 
argue that the current level of bioethanol production in China, which consumed 3.54% of total 
maize production of the country, reduced market availability of maize for other uses by about 
6%. It is projected that depending on the types of feedstock, 5 to 10% of the total cultivated 
land in China would need to be devoted to meet the biofuel production target of 12 million 
metric tons for the year 2020 [70]. The associated water requirement would amount to 3272 
    per year, approximately equivalent to the annual discharge of the Yellow River. The net 
contribution of biofuel to the national energy pool could be limited due to generally low net 
energy return of conventional feedstocks. The current biofuel development paths could pose 
significant impacts on China’s food supply, trade, and therefore food commodity prices (see 
also [56]). The impact of India’s biofuel program, if successful, on food and water supply is 
also likely to be minimal as its policies intend to promote the cultivation of a non-edible and 
drought-tolerant biofuel crops such as Jatropha curcas on nonagricultural land [53].  
Data also show that wheat and rice crops, which have not been utilized to a significant extent as 
biofuels, are the crops that recorded the highest percentage increase in price in recent years 
(refer to Figures 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c)). This clearly suggests that in addition to being region 
specific, the analyses need to be crop specific. Goldemberg and Guardabassi show that impact 
on food commodity prices is minimal in the case of ethanol produced from sugarcane in Brazil, 
which  is  cheaper  and  less  intensive  in  inputs  such  as  land,  water,  fertilizer  and  energy 
compared to corn and biodiesel [27].  
Recent papers highlighted the food commodity price increases as one among several key 
negative impacts of first-generation biofuels [40, 41, 55]. These papers argue that some of 
these environmental and societal costs may be ameliorated or reversed with the development 
and use of next-generation biofuel feedstocks, especially cellulosic biomass from different 
types of wastes (agricultural, forestry, and municipal) and energy grasses such as switchgrass 
and Miscanthus. Certain types of biofuels do represent potential sources of alternative energy, 
but their use needs to be tempered with a comprehensive assessment of their environmental 
impacts.  When  evaluating  the  causes  of  food  commodity  price  spikes,  not  only  regional 
differences  should  be  modeled,  but  also  technological  differences.  Moreover,  policy  and 
differences in policy among nations should also be addressed.  
Historically,  agricultural commodity prices  were low, and markets  were characterized by 10 
 
excess  supply  [24].  A  recent  spike  in  energy  prices  challenged  this.  Globalization, 
accompanied by capital flows, led to increase in energy demand and made biofuel a viable 
alternative [35, 36]. These changes challenge existing policy, as well as the (poor) response by 
policy practitioners in developing countries to the 2007-08 food crisis. To this end, farm 
support in higher income countries is a testament to the fundamental social economic and 
political importance of agriculture, and it leads to a very different set of issues with respect to 
the fuel-versus-food debate. Baka and Roland-Holst argue that the advent of biofuels offers a 
new opportunity for agriculture to contribute to society in Europe, and do so in a way that 
reduces trade rivalry and improves energy security [8]. Holding current agricultural production 
constant, they find that the EU has the potential to reduce oil imports between 6% and 28% by 
converting eligible agricultural crops into biofuels under two differing conversion scenarios.  
During the 2007-08 food crisis, many countries took steps to try to minimize the effects of 
higher prices on their populations. Argentina, Bolivia, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela, and 
Vietnam are among those that have taken the easy option of restricting food exports, setting 
limits on food commodity prices, or both. For example, China has banned rice and maize 
exports; India has banned exports of rice and milk powder; Bolivia has banned the export of 
soy oil to Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela; and Ethiopia has banned 
exports of major cereals. These policies contributed to the severity of the food crisis and caused 
contraction  of  the  global  food  markets.  Other  nations,  however,  have  contributed  to  the 
expansion of the global food market. Some net food-importing developing countries reduced 
import barriers. Morocco, for instance, cut tariffs on wheat imports from 130% to 2.5%; 
Nigeria cut its rice import tax from 100% to just 2.7% [67]. Although tariff reductions, in 
theory, may contribute to the increase in world food prices, it does reduce domestic prices in 
those countries.  
Differences  in  institutions  and  the  competitive  setup  lead  to  differences  in  regulation  of 
agricultural  biotechnology,  where  the  regulatory  framework  ranges  from  promotional  to 
preventive, and subsequently to differences in the rate of innovation [34]. These differences 
also lead to differences among nations in utilization of agricultural biotechnology. Although 
agricultural biotechnology introduces an indirect effect on yield by reducing crop losses and 
improved control of damage and diseases, and therefore contributes to food security, political 
economic considerations prevent its adoption on a global scale [28, 29, 34, 49].  
Another emerging line of research uses a time-series tool to investigate the links between the 11 
 
prices of various commodities. Serra et al. [61] used nonlinear time-series models to assess the 
price relationship within the U.S. ethanol industry. They used daily data on ethanol corn and 
crude oil prices and identified equilibrium relationships between these prices. They found that 
when corn prices are high relative to fuel prices, ethanol prices are mostly affected by the price 
of corn. When the price of corn is low relative to the price of fuel, then ethanol prices are likely 
to follow the price of fuel. Similarly, Balcombe and Rapsomanikis [9] established a consistent 
long-term equilibrium between ethanol prices and the price of sugarcane and oil using data 
from Brazil.  
In summary, the literature suggests that one has to contend with several factors in order to 
explain the causes for the food crisis. On the demand side, another major factor is rapid 
economic  growth  in  emerging  economies,  which  increased  demand  for  meat,  a  highly 
grain-intensive  product.  On  the  supply  side,  bad  weather  in  key  grain-producing  regions 
(especially wheat-growing regions such as Australia), stagnation of productivity growth (due 
to  underinvestment  in  agricultural  research  and  technology  and  infrastructure  such  as 
irrigation), and increase in production costs (due to high energy prices) have resulted in slow or 
negative growth in production. Prices spiraled even further as a result of policies such as export 
bans on grains and import tariffs on non-grain biofuels (especially the U.S. import tariffs on 
cane ethanol from Brazil) and on account of speculative activity in reaction to such policies. 
Lastly, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to major world currencies has also been a 
contributing  factor  to  commodity  price  increases.  Historically,  when  the  dollar  is  weak, 
commodity prices tend to be higher and, when the dollar is strong, commodity prices tend to be 
lower. However, with different countries adopting different policies toward biofuels and trade, 
assessing the country-level impacts of these factors require case-by-case analysis.  
With several such factors at play, identifying the contribution of any one factor such as biofuel 
is a challenging task. The estimates of the impact of biofuels that can be found in the literature 
are wide ranging, ranging between 3% and 75%. One reason why the optimistic estimates may 
be an underestimate is because of a lack of representation of the market for inventory. We are 
not  aware  of  any  standard  equilibrium  models  including  those  mentioned  earlier  that 
incorporate an explicit representation of the market for inventory.  
3. Historical trends 
Historical trends in production, consumption, inventory, and price at the global level for four 
major crops, namely, maize, wheat, rice, and soybeans, are shown in figures 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 12 
 
and 3(d), respectively.
9 It can be seen that crop prices are countercyclical to inventory levels. 
In years that prices increased the level of inventory declined and vice versa.  
[Historical data for maize]  
  








[Historical data for rice]  
                                                 
9 Data on inventory levels were obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s PSD database, while the data on the 
international price were obtained from the IMF price database on prices of primary commodities (available online at 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/ and http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp, respectively). Price data were 
not available for the years prior to 1980 and, hence, are not shown. 13 
 
  
[Historical data for soybean]  
  
Figure 3. Historical data 
Figures 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c) show trends since the year 2004. While consumption of coarse 
grains and rice has increased, the consumption of wheat has remained constant. Increase in 
coarse grain consumption was driven by increase in demand in the United States and to a lesser 
extent from EU and China. The increase in U.S. demand is attributable to the increase in 







[Recent trends for coarse grains] 14 
 
 
[Recent trends for wheat]  
  
[Recent trends for rice]  
  
Figure 4. Trends in grain 
Figure 5 shows for corn, soybean, and rapeseed the share of the total supply of each crop 
allocated for biofuel in recent years. We can see that the share of crops allocated to biofuels is 
substantial for rapeseed but not for corn and soybean. This results in biofuel becoming an 
important factor for increase in price of rapeseed, but less important for other crops, as will be 15 
 
demonstrated below.  
  
Figure 5. Crop use for biofuel as a share of world crop supply 
Rice consumption, which is concentrated in Asian countries, increased 40% in the last 30 
years, from 61.5 kilogram (kg) per capita to about 85.9 kg per capita. In addition, most rice is 
consumed  in  the  same  country  where  it  is  produced.  This  is  one  of  the  most  important 
characteristics of the rice markets. Domestic rice markets are segmented and often one of the 
most protected.  
Overall  demand  for  food  and  feed  due  to  economic  growth  and  population  growth  (in 
developing countries) and demand for biofuels (in OECD countries) accompanied by slow 
rates  of  increase  in  output  and  adverse  weather  shocks  have  meant  demand  exceeded 
production in recent years leading to a drawing down of inventory levels which have reached a 
historical low.  
4. The story: Some descriptive statistics 
Worldwide growth in demand during the last several decades, coupled with a slowdown in 
agricultural production growth, reduced global stockpiles of basic commodities like corn, 
soybeans, and wheat [66] (see also Figure 6). Lower stocks, in turn, made it more likely that 
new sources of demand (e.g., biofuels), or disruptions to supply (e.g., drought), will result in 
large price changes.  16 
 
  
Figure 6. The observed correlation between price and inventory 
The spike in food commodity prices was not instantaneous, but resulted from a steady but 
gradual decline in stock-to-use. On the supply side, sluggish growth in world food production 
between 1995 and 2003, and a decline of stock-to-use ratio of world grain and oilseed stocks 
from 35% in 1985 to less than 15% in 2005 [66] – Stock-to-use ratio declined by more than 
50%.  Low  food  commodity  prices  over  the  last  several  decades  reduced  incentives  for 
maintaining food stockpiles and for funding research and development to increase yields. 
Regulation  in  key  regions  also  hampered  research  and  development  of  yield-enhancing 
technologies.  
The sluggish growth in food production, coupled with rapid growth in manufacturing 
production, causes biased expansion of the production possibility frontier toward 
manufacturing goods.
10 Agricultural output in the emerging markets for the last two decades 
has been at most about half that of GDP growth. In China, 20% of humanity and the world’s 
largest consumer and producer of food, non-agriculture productivity has been growing 3-5 
times faster than agriculture. 
This bias suggests higher food prices. We illustrate this graphically in figure 7. Assume the 
world  is  producing  food,  denoted    ,  and  manufacturing,  denoted    ,  with  increasing 
opportunity  costs,  and  homothetic  preferences.  In  addition,  normalize  the  price  of 
manufacturing to  . Then, curve    in Figure 7 depicts the world production possibility 
frontier before biased growth. The equilibrium price equals   , and the amount of food and 
manufacturing produced and consumed are    and   , respectively. Introducing growth that 
                                                 
10Although Mitra and Martin [45] found that agriculture and manufacturing growth rates are converging, but the productivity 
of several commodities like wheat and soybeans have been lagging because of regulation that did not enable adopting of new 
biotechnologies (Alston et al. [4], Sexton et al. [62] and Graff et al. [27]). 
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is biased toward manufacturing results in the production possibility frontier   , such that 
equilibrium  consumption  and  production  are  now     and    .  Although  both  food  and 
manufacturing  production  and  consumption  increase,  the  equilibrium  price  of  food  after 
expansion is higher. The sluggish growth in production of food results in higher food prices. 
Although decomposing the supply side is outside the scope of this work, this simple example 
illustrates how underinvestment in agricultural productivity contributes to higher food prices, 
while employing a general equilibrium framework.11  
In the 1980s and 1990s growth in agriculture outpaced growth in other sectors (Martin and 
Warr, [45]) and therefore the terms-of-trade moved against agriculture. However, in the late 
1990s  and  the  beginning  of  the  21st  most  of  the  developing  world  (e.g.,  China,  India, 
Indonesia, and now Africa) experienced very high growth rates (above 4% and in some major 
countries around 10%), as documented in Nin-Pratt et al. [50] and Fuglie and Schimmelpfennig 
[22], resulting in the terms-of-trade changing in favor of agriculture. Furthermore, from a 
partial equilibrium perspective, the economic growth also results in strong demand growth for 
food, which also suggests that the price of food increases.  
 
Figure 7. The production possibility frontier and biased growth 
At the same time, strong global growth in average income and rising population (roughly 75 
million people worldwide per year), particularly in developing countries, increased food and 
feed  demand.  As  per  capita  incomes  rose,  consumers  in  developing  countries  not  only 
increased per capita consumption of staple foods, but also diversified their diets to include 
more meats, dairy products, and vegetable oils. This, in turn, amplified rising demand for 
grains and oilseeds used as feed. To illustrate this, we computed the correlation coefficient 
between consumption and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP/capita). Although we do 
                                                 
11Hochman et al. [37] showed, while employing a general equilibrium trade model, that technological innovation in the 












not hold all other factors constant, and the correlation between consumption and GDP/capita 
does  not  identify  causation,  it  does  suggest  a  strong  positive  linear  relation  between 
consumption and income at the world level for corn, soybean, rapeseed, and oil palm, and 
correlation coefficient of about 0.75 for rice and wheat (Table 2). The positive correlation 
computed above suggests that income is an important factor affecting consumption, and thus 
prices.  Note  that  although  globally  the  correlation  between  consumption  and  income  is 
positive, in some regions it may be negative. Most notably, corn, rice, and wheat consumption 
in China declined during 2001 to 2007. Below we use income elasticity of demand from 
existing literature to incorporate income growth into our analysis.  
Table 2. Correlation between income and consumption of major agricultural commodities in major 
regions during 2001 to 2007 
Region    Corn   Soybean   Rapeseed   Rice   Wheat   Oilpalm   
Argentina   0.87   0.99     0.39   -0.04    
Brazil    0.89   0.89     -0.13   0.80   0.97   
China   -0.53   0.97   0.10   -0.94   -0.44   0.93   
EU27    0.68   -0.63   0.96   0.80   0.16   0.97   
India   0.78   0.90   0.59   0.51   0.66   0.28   
US   0.82   0.53   0.81   0.71   -0.50   0.89   
ROW   0.98   0.35   0.98   0.98   0.86   0.99   
World   .98   .98   .94   .74   .76   .99   
 
Figures 4a-4f depict world consumption of various coarse grains and oil crops.  
1.  It illustrates the upward trend in global consumption from 2001 to 2007 for the various 
crops. From 2001 to 2007, demand grew, and the demand curve for the different crops shifted 
up and to the right. For some crops, however, the growth rate was larger than for others. 
Whereas corn demand grew by about 30%, rapeseed demand grew by almost 100% from 2001 
to 2007.  
2.  In addition, growth was not symmetric across regions. Whereas globally consumption 
of all crops increased with income (at the world level, income is positively correlated with 
consumption, and world income grew throughout the period investigated), in some regions 
consumption of certain crops decreased. For example, corn, rice, and wheat consumption in 
China went down by 12.7%, 23.7%, and 20.9%, respectively, although global consumption 




[Corn consumption]         [Soybean consumption]  
  
[Rapeseed consumption]       [Rice consumption]  
    
[Wheat consumption]       [Oil palm consumption]  
  
Figure 8. World consumption of major crops over time 
Under a competitive equilibrium, supply equals demand (point A in Figure 9). There is no 
pressure for prices to change. As Ivanic and Martin [38] show, while employing the GTAP 
model  and  assuming  uniform  productivity  growth  across  agriculture  and  non-agriculture 
products, although the real agricultural prices would rise over the period to 2050 growth in 
income will result in both changes in demand and supply. The change in demand is depicted in 
Fig. 9, whereas both changes are depicted in Fig. 10.  
A shift in the demand curve, for instance, due to higher income or biofuels, all else being 
constant, results in excess demand. If only demand shifted, then at price    in Figure 9 the 
quantity of goods demanded by consumers is   . Conversely, the quantity of goods that 
producers are willing to produce is   . There are not enough crops produced to satisfy the 






























































































































making suppliers want to supply more crop and bringing the price to its new equilibrium level, 
i.e.,    and    in Figure 9.  
  
Figure 9. Excess demand creates pressure for price increase 
Now assume supply, in addition to demand, shifted to the right. These shifts result in excess 
demand when the demand curve shifted relatively more. Figure 10 depicts this scenario. At 
equilibrium, we observe price and quantity,     and   , respectively. The excess demand 
leading to this new equilibrium should be computed at the original price level of   , and in our 
example equals            . The excess demand created upward pressure on prices, and 
resulted in an equilibrium price of        . To compute the excess demand, we need to adjust 
for the price change. This is done by moving along the new supply and demand functions, 
while using own-price elasticity of demand and supply and the observed price and quantity 
changes.  Put  differently,  excess  demand  caused  the  quantity  demanded  to  decrease  by 
       , and the quantity supplied to  increase by         . The own-price demand and 
supply elasticities are    and   , respectively:  
              
       
  
     
              
       
  
     
 
The excess demand surplus equals the sum of the two, i.e.,        .  
When introducing inventory, global domestic consumption does not need to equal production 














inventories (note that we assume balanced trade, such that globally total imports equal total 
exports).  This  scenario  is  what  we  observe  for  the  different  crops  (Figure  10).  World 
production was more sluggish, on average, and domestic consumption outpaced production for 
most periods/crops. This depleted inventories (see Figure 19 below), which led us to the 
2007-08 price spike. Rice is an exception. To this end, and following the literature, trade 
restrictions played a key role in the spike in rice prices [1], where exporting countries limited 
exports and mitigated upward pressure on domestic prices only to exacerbate the spike in the 
price of rice in the rice-importing countries (which includes many least-developing countries).  
  
Figure 10. Price increases when supply shifts out less than does demand  
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[Production and domestic consumption of soybeans] 
 
[Production and domestic consumption of rapeseeds] 
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2004￿ 2005￿ 2006￿ 2007￿
Excess￿ demand￿ 8440￿ -4156￿ 513￿ 3840￿
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[Production and domestic consumption of wheat] 
 
[Production and domestic consumption of oilpalm] 
 
                                              
The use of biofuels had been modest for several decades, but production rose rapidly in the 
United States beginning in 2003 and in the EU starting in 2005. Output increased in response to 
mounting concerns about rising petroleum prices, the availability of oil supplies, and the 
environmental impacts of fossil fuels. The growth in worldwide biofuels demand contributed 
to higher prices for biofuel feedstocks. Biofuel feedstocks like corn, sugarcane, soybeans, and 
rapeseed now have new uses beyond food and feed. The demand curve now expands and 
biofuel, like income and population growth, caused demand to shift up and to the right. The 
share of biofuel in excess demand, however, varies with crops. Assume demand and supply of 
own-price elasticity of -0.1 and 0.1, respectively. We use these elasticities to compute the 
excess demand. Whereas the share of biofuel in excess demand increased for corn from 29% in 
2001 to more than 60% by 2007, it was less than 1% for soybean. Rapeseed is at the other 
2002￿ 2003￿ 2004￿ 2005￿ 2006￿ 2007￿
Excess￿ demand￿ 21445￿ 33355￿ 35258￿ -22939￿ 23130￿ 52663￿




































extreme,  where  the  share  of  biofuel  dwarfs  the  excess  demand  (Figure  11).  Note  that 
introducing higher elasticities (0.2 and -0.2, respectively), results in a smaller biofuel impact 
because the excess demand will now be larger.  
[Excess demand and supply of corn for ethanol] 
   
 [Excess demand and supply of soybean for biodiesel]  
  
[Excess demand and supply of rapeseed for biodiesel]  
  
Figure 
 12. Share of crop demand for biofuel in excess crop demand 
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The increase in food commodity prices over the last several years is part of a general increase 
in  global  commodity  prices,  including  minerals,  metals,  and  energy.  Although  the  food 
commodity price index rose to a historic high in 2007-08, the price indices for all commodities, 
and for crude oil in particular, have significantly outpaced it. In fact, between January 2002 and 
July 2008, the IMF price index for food commodities rose 130%, compared with 330% for all 
commodities and 590% for crude oil.  
Another factor to consider is the increase in energy prices [33]. To this end, the energy impact 
on food commodity prices should be divided into two factors: the allocation of land to biofuel 
crops (which reduces food and feed availability and increases the aggregate demand for food 
commodities), and the increase in energy prices (which increases production costs and reduces 
the supply of food commodities). See also Hochman et al. [32]. First-generation biofuels, 
which are derived primarily from corn and sugarcane, compete with food and feed, resulting in 
higher demand for agricultural commodities and thus in higher prices. The introduction of 
biofuels, however, also lowers fuel prices [54]. Yet, the literature fails to recognize that lower 
fuel prices affect farm-level costs. Introducing energy markets, with all its complexity, to our 
multi-market framework reduces the impact of biofuels on food commodity prices further.  
To reiterate, the data show that successive years of positive excess demand led to the gradual 
depletion of inventory, which reached an historical low in 2008.  
The following section discusses the implications of inventory and describes one approach for 
modeling the demand for inventory in a multi-market equilibrium framework.  
5. An analytical framework with inventory demand 
The peak of the food crisis marked the depletion of stored grain stocks to historically low levels 
that had not been witnessed since the 1970s [52, 68]. For storable goods, the ability to adjust 
the level of inventory can play a crucial role in maintaining price stability and reducing price 
volatility when there is a supply or demand shock [68]. During periods of excess supply, 
demand from storers protects producers from rapidly descending prices, while during periods 
of scarcity; supply from inventory protects consumers from rapidly ascending prices.  
We do not focus on the theoretical underpinnings of speculative inventory, which is dynamic 
and forward looking. Anticipation of future inventory decisions affects current ones, and this 
complexity is augmented by the inventory constraints, i.e., one cannot borrow from the future 
or  that  inventory  cannot  be  negative  [68].  Instead  we  assume  that  one  can  estimate  an 26 
 
empirically derived inventory demand function using historical data on prices and inventory.  
Formally harvest,  , is a function of past period crop prices   
   , where   
         
         
    
and             such that   denotes the set of crops and   denotes a region. Assuming 
prices  follow a random walk, then suggests that the end of period    inventory is only a 
function of current and past prices, as well as the beginning stocks in period  , i.e.,     
    
    
         .  
Consumption demand for crops comprises of demand for food (     and demand for biofuel 
production (    . Both demand for food/feed and demand for biofuels are a function of the 
price of crops (  
   and the price of energy (    
   . In addition, demand for food and feed at 
region   at time   is a function of GDP per capita,       
 .  
With inventory, the equilibrium price does not need to equate harvest,     
  , plus imports, 
     
  , with consumption,          , plus exports,      
  . However, it should equate world 
supply,        
         
      , plus global beginning stock,     , with world demand,        
     
     
   , plus global ending stocks,   :  
        
         
   
 
    
            
         
   
 
    
    (1) 
The left-hand side can be called total availability,   , at time  . The equilibrium condition can 
now be written as  
        
         
     
    
          
 
    
     (2) 
         
     
    
        
          
     
    
          
     
    
         
       
 
 
   
            
      
Knowing              
               
  
 ,  and  the  shape  of  demand  functions     ,  one  can 
determine the effect of different levels of biofuel mandates     on crop prices.  27 
 
  
Figure 13. Graphical representation of equilibrium with demand for inventory 
A graphical representation of such equilibrium is shown in Figure 13. This model also suggests 
that given demand exceeds harvest, lower beginning stocks lead to higher prices. Therefore, a 
fixed biofuel mandate will cause prices to increase more as the level of inventories declines. 
Figure 14 shows total demand for a crop under two situations, with and without biofuel, and 
total availability under two situations, with a high and low level of inventory. We can see that 
as availability decreases, the impact of a biofuel mandate increases. This also suggests that 
holding harvest constant, a model without inventory overestimates the price effect of biofuel.  
  
Figure 14. Biofuel effect depends on crop availability: Low availability causes higher price impact 28 
 
6. Multi-market analysis 
 
The simple partial equilibrium model, while important, has some limitations. The actors in the 
market are characterized as either producers or consumers, and their welfare is aggregated 
accordingly. For instance, when analyzing the staple crop market, we implicitly assume that 
the benefits to biofuel refineries are part of the consumer surplus. Being able to disaggregate 
markets is, therefore, crucial if we are to accurately describe, prescribe, and explain policy’s 
impact on food commodity prices. Although different from the general equilibrium model (the 
multi-market model does not assume consumption expenditures are endogenous and depends 
on factor payments and endowment incomes, and it does fix factor prices), the multi-market 
framework does allow a partial disaggregation of the vertical structure to (i) crops for food 
production and processing and (ii) crops for energy production, as well as a horizontal structure 
disaggregation in which the feedback effects between the different crop markets are also 
required. Whereas the horizontal structure (Figure 15) captures the effect of input prices on 
allocation of resources among the different staple crops, the vertical structure (Figure 16) 
captures the interactions along the supply chain of a staple crop.   
  
Figure 15. Horizontal structure 29 
 
  
Figure 16. Vertical structure 
Although these effects have been modeled extensively in GTAP, FAPRI, and IFPRI models, to 
the best of our knowledge, the importance of inventory and its effect on outcomes has not yet 
been analyzed.  
 
6.1. Horizontal structure 
Different staple crops compete for the same input; namely, land and energy. Thus, an increase 
in China’s demand for soybeans may trigger a decline in land allocated to competing crops 
such as maize, which in turn causes supply of maize to contract. Strong growth rates in China 
not only cause the price of soybean to increase, but it also increases the price of other staple 
crops that compete with soybeans over land. To this end, the cross-elasticity of quantity of 
maize supplied with respect to the price of soybean is negative.  
Similar effects exist when staple crops are used to produce energy, as opposed to food. Increase 
in demand for maize-ethanol increases the amount of land allocated to maize-ethanol, and it 
reduces land allocated to other crops such as soybeans, as well as maize for food and feed. An 
increase in the price of energy results in higher demand for maize, and thus higher prices; albeit 
quantity of maize demanded for food and feed is now lower.  
Consumers may substitute between different staple crops. An increase in the price of crop A is 30 
 
accompanied by an increase in demand of crop B. As the price of maize increases, maize for 
feed  may  be  substituted  with  soybeans.  Similarly,  as  the  price  of  rice  increases,  wheat 
consumption increases. On the other hand, the nutritional characteristics of soybean for feed 
may complement those of maize—the two crops may then be complements, not substitutes.  
Identifying the dominant forces between the different staple crops is crucial for correctly 
disaggregating the horizontal structure. In sum, the horizontal structure is influenced by (i) 
factors affecting derived demand for inputs (especially land and energy), and by (ii) factors 
influencing  demand  for  the  different  crops,  especially  growth  in  disposable  income  and 
biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel) consumption. Many of these factors are not specific to the 
horizontal  structure  of  crop  production,  and  are  also  affected  by  the  vertical  structure. 
Therefore,  and  to  better  understand  these  cross-market  effects,  we  next  disaggregate  the 
vertical structure.  
 
6.2. Vertical structure 
Demand for staple crops is affected by the introduction of new markets, namely, ethanol and 
biodiesels. More specifically, production of ethanol and biodiesels created new demand for 
staple crops, which further increased the price of the feedstock (the staple crops used to 
produce biofuels). Increasing demand for staple crops triggers an increase in land allocated to 
crops used to produce first-generation biofuels, i.e., less land allocated to food and feed and 
more allocated to energy production. This effect is augmented when the price of crude oil—a 
main source of transportation fuel— increases [36]. The surge in crude oil prices during 2007 
created a very profitable (although temporary) environment for crops used to produce biofuels 
[35]. Many farmers switched to crops used to produce ethanol and biodiesel, and limited the 
amount of crops sold to the food markets. The competition between uses (food, feed, and 
feedstock) within a feedstock market can become intense, much more than between food grain 
and feed grain. The vertical structure is influenced by input markets (especially energy), and by 
demand for the different end products, especially food and feed versus biofuel (ethanol and 
biodiesel) consumption.  
 
6.3. The numerical model 
We now use the horizontal and vertical structure discussed above to model our empirical 31 
 
model.  Our  model  extends  the  single-region,  single-crop  model  with  inventory  discussed 
above in section 3, to a multi-region framework, where demand for each crop is composed of 
food/feed, inventory, and where applicable, demand for biofuels. We apply the model for five 
major crops, namely, corn, soybean, rapeseed, rice, and wheat. With the exception of rice and 
wheat, all the other crops are currently being used to produce biofuel.  
Biofuel from corn, soybean, and rapeseed is jointly produced along with a co-product that is 
itself a substitute for the raw grain or the oilseed. For instance, in the case of corn, 1 bushel (56 
pounds) of corn yields approximately 2.75 gallons of ethanol and 18 pounds of distiller grains, 
which is a substitute for corn grain. A fraction of the quantity of original crop used for biofuel 
is replaced in the form of co-product. Therefore, for these three crops, we compute an effective 
demand of the particular crop for biofuel, which equals the crop consumption for biofuel minus 
the quantity of a co-product. In the case of corn, the effective demand of corn is           
       bushels per 2.75 gallons of ethanol. We assume that biofuel production function is of 
Leontief (fixed-proportion) type.  
We divide the world into seven major regions, namely, Argentina, Brazil, China, European 
Union (EU-27 countries), India, United States, and an aggregate that represents the rest of the 
world (ROW), and focus on the time period between the year 2001 and the year 2007.  
Let     
   be harvest of crop   in region   at time  ,      
   is demand of crop   in region   at 
time    for  food/feed  consumption,       
   is  demand  for  crop    in  region    at  time    for 
biofuel  production,  and      
   is  global  demand  for  inventory  of  crop    at  time   .  Let 
                   and   denote constants which are determined through calibration of the 
supply and demand functions,   
  denotes exchange rate of currency in region   at time   
with respect to the US$,     
        
     
  is world price of crop   at time  , and      
        
     
  
is world price of energy at time  .  
With the exception of the demand for inventory, we assume a linear structure for supply and 
demand. The linear structure generally serves as a good approximation for small disturbances 
or shocks. Supply, which is the sum of harvest and imports of crop  in region   at time  , is 
modeled as,  
      
                 
     
          
      
     (3) 
Demand, which is the sum of domestic demand for food/feed consumption and the demand for 32 
 
exports of crop   in region   at time   is modeled as,  
       
                 
     
          
      
              
   (4) 
 
Similarly, the derived demand for crop    for  biofuel  production  in  region    at  time    is 
modeled as  
       
                  
     
          
      
     (5) 
In the case where biofuel  production is  determined through a mandate, the derived crop 
demand for biofuel is simply a fixed proportion of the mandate.  
Crop demand for inventory (Eq. 6) is represented as a nonlinear function of price and follows 
Carter et al. [14]. This equation is depicted graphically in figure 17 for corn inventory using the 
parameters for   and   as estimated by Carter et al. This clearly shows that larger changes in 
inventory levels would correspond to smaller changes in crop prices,  
      
     
   
    
    
 
    
    
 
  
    
     (6) 
 
  
Figure 17. Inventory demand function 
6.4. Model calibration 
We calibrate the crop supply and crop demand functions for each crop, region, and year, once 33 
 
with demand for inventory and once without. The calibrated demand and supply parameters are 
used to numerically calculate the effect of each of the different shocks on the observed price in 
a given year.  
Table 3. Range of elasticities contained in the literature cited in FAPRI database 
    Supply (1)   Demand (2)   Income (3)   
Commodity   Region   min   max   min   max   min   max   
Corn   Argentina   0.65   0.75   -0.4   -0.3   0.35   0.45   
  Brazil   0.37   0.47   -0.4   -0.1   0.35   0.45   
  China   0.08   0.18   -0.14   -0.6   0.75   1   
  EU   0.01   0.13   -0.44   -0.24   0.1   0.2   
  India   0.16   0.26   -0.28   -0.22   0.75   1   
  U.S.  0.45   0.55   -0.24   -0.1   0.05   0.1   
  ROW   0.45   0.55   -0.43   -0.21   0.4   0.6   
Soybeans   Argentina   0.27   0.37   -0.3   -0.2   0.35   0.45   
  Brazil   0.29   0.39   -0.21   -0.11   0.35   0.45   
  China   0.4   0.5   -0.25   -0.15   0.75   1   
  EU   0.14   0.24   -0.3   -0.2   0.1   0.2   
  India   0.31   0.41   -0.35   -0.25   0.75   1   
  U.S.  0.18   0.28   -0.48   -0.31   0.05   0.1   
  ROW   0.18   0.28   -0.48   -0.31   0.4   0.6   
Rapeseed   Argentina   0.53   0.63   -0.35   -0.03   0.35   0.45   
  Brazil   0.53   0.63   -0.35   -0.03   0.35   0.45   
  China   0.21   0.31   -0.35   -0.25   0.75   1   
  EU   0.23   0.33   -0.13   -0.03   0.1   0.2   
  India   0.29   0.39   -0.3   -0.2   0.75   1   
  U.S.  0.53   0.63   -0.35   -0.03   0.05   0.1   
  ROW   0.53   0.63   -0.35   -0.03   0.4   0.6   
Rice   Argentina   0.27   0.37   -0.43   -0.38   0.35   0.45   
  Brazil   0.27   0.37   -0.43   -0.38   0.35   0.45   
  China   0.27   0.37   -0.71   -0.54   0.75   1   
  EU   0.27   0.37   -0.43   -0.38   0.1   0.2   
  India   0.27   0.37   -0.43   -0.38   0.75   1   
  U.S.  0.27   0.37   -0.87   -0.77   0.05   0.1   
  ROW   0.27   0.37   -0.43   -0.38   0.4   0.6   
Wheat   Argentina   0.36   0.46   -0.39   -0.28   0.35   0.45   
  Brazil   0.38   0.48   -0.38   -0.27   0.35   0.45   
  China   0.04   0.14   -0.18   -0.07   0.75   1   
  EU   0.07   0.17   -0.33   -0.26   0.1   0.2   
  India   0.24   0.34   -0.37   -0.32   0.75   1   
  U.S.  0.43   0.53   -0.35   -0.25   0.05   0.1   
  ROW   0.43   0.53   -0.35   -0.25   0.4   0.6   
1.  Own price elasticity of supply 
2.  Own price elasticity of demand 
3.  Income elasticity of supply 34 
 
Key parameters in the calibration of these functions are elasticities of supply and demand, i.e., 
the sensitivity of a relative change in quantities supplied or demanded to a given relative 
change in (energy) prices. Given the wide range of elasticities reported in the literature and the 
sensitivity of the simulation to elasticities, for each crop we chose to sample 100 times from 
within a range of elasticities. The range of elasticities is shown in Table 3. The elasticity of 
supply and demand with respect to energy price is assumed to lie within the range          
and              , respectively. This reflects the assumption that demand is less responsive 
than is supply to energy prices. 
Note that our specification does not include cross-price elasticities on the supply or the demand 
side. The reason for this is to overcome computational constraints. We chose to investigate the 
robustness of the results through a sensitivity analysis with respect to own-price, income, and 
energy elasticities and by employing alternative specifications of the demand function. Our 
computational capacity did not allow us to introduce cross-price elasticities to this numerical 
exercise. This limitation will be addressed in future work.  
 
Table 4. Inventory demand parameters 
 
Parameter   corn   soybean   rice   wheat   
    0.0186   0.0186   0.0186   0.0186   
    -0.8004   -.5096   -.5096   -1.4676   
 
Following Carter et al. [14] we estimated the inventory demand parameters using instrumental 
variable techniques, because inventory is correlated with the disturbance, whereas harvest is 
uncorrelated with these disturbances but correlated with inventory (harvest is both exogenous 
and  relevant).  We  estimated  the  inventory  demand  function,  while  using  harvest  as  an 
instrumental variable. We tested alternative specifications and also introduced crop-specific 
dummy variables (Table 4). In all cases, however, we could not reject the hypothesis that the 
specification chosen is correct.  
Given the relevant elasticities for each region, we calibrate the parameters a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, k, 
and l as follows:   
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where    denotes the year chosen for calibration,      is own-price elasticity of supply of crop 
  in region  ,      is elasticity of supply of crop   in region   with respect to energy price,      
is own-price elasticity of demand of crop   in region   for food/feed consumption,      is 
own-price elasticity of demand for crop   in region   for biofuel production,      is elasticity 
of crop demand for biofuel production with respect to energy price for crop   in region  , and 
     is the income elasticity of demand of crop   in region  .  
 
6.5. Description of the shocks 
To calculate the impact of each of the various factors contributing to the change in average 
yearly price for each commodity, we shock the system (in our case the equation that represents 36 
 
the market-clearing condition for each commodity) and calculate the counter-factual world 
price that would have prevailed for the commodity. We simulate four different types of shocks, 
namely, a biofuel shock (due to biofuel mandates), a food/feed demand shock (due to economic 
growth), an exchange rate shock, and an energy price shock. We simulate one shock at a time. 
For each type of shock, we set the value of the shocked parameter equal to its value in the base 
year. To give an example, the biofuel shock for corn in the year 2005 is computed as the ratio of 
the world  corn biofuel  production in  2001 (     billion gallons) and  world corn biofuel 
production in 2005 (    billion gallons), which is equal to     . We simulate each of these 
shocks for six years, 2002 through 2007. Furthermore, we simulate the shocks twice, once with 
a market for inventory and once without, where inventories are added to aggregate supply and 
demand. We perform 100 simulations of the scenario for the various shocks for each crop and 
for each time period. The reported value is the mean of these outcomes. 
1.  Income shock: To simulate the income shock, we multiply the income coefficient of 
the demand for food/feed for that region by a scalar. The scalar takes a value greater than one in 
the  case  of  positive  income  shock  and  a  value  less  than  one  with  a  negative  shock. 
Mathematically, the market-clearing identity is now represented as,  
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where,  
     
       
        
       
         
                  
     
          
      
            
         
  
and     
    is a scalar quantity used to simulate a shock. Although the counterfactual scenario 
assumes no income growth, the income elasticity remains positive. 
2.  Biofuel demand shock: The biofuel shock is used to simulate a condition with no 
biofuel production. Mathematically, the market-clearing identity is now represented as,  37 
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where     
    is a binary variable. When it is zero, it simulates a counterfactual scenario with no 
biofuel.  
3.  Exchange rate shock: To simulate changes in the exchange rate over time, we multiply 
all  prices  within  a  given  region  by  the  annual  exchange  rate.  Mathematically,  the 
market-clearing identity becomes,  
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where     
     is a scalar quantity used to simulate an exchange rate shock that affects the 
domestic price in a region. Since in our model this is the only path through which prices can 
differ between regions, this work overestimates the exchange rate effect.  
4.  Energy price shock: To simulate changes in energy prices over time, we multiply 
energy prices within a given region by the annual change in energy prices. Mathematically, the 
market-clearing identity becomes,  
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where     
    is a scalar quantity used to simulate an energy price.  
 
6.6. Numerical scenarios 
Given  the  cumulative  change  in  a  variable  with  respect  to  the  year  2001,  we  use  the 
market-clearing condition to derive a counterfactual equilibrium world price for each crop for 
the various shocks for each year. We do so for four different alternative scenarios which either 
differ in the assumed range for elasticities used in calibration of supply and demand functions, 
or differ in the specification of the demand for food/feed (whether GDP per capita is explicitly 
represented in demand) or differ in parameters of the inventory demand function. Given the 
challenge of estimating a point estimate for the various elasticities, as well as the inventory 
parameters, we simulated these alternative scenarios to determine the robustness of our results.  
The first scenario, which we henceforth refer to as the baseline scenario, is one in which we 
use the range of price and income elasticities reported in the literature, namely, that mentioned 
in the USDA’s database of elasticities and in the FAPRI database. Under this scenario, the 
parameters for the inventory demand function are those that we estimate ourselves using the 
specification of Carter et al. [14]. As mentioned earlier, we perform 100 simulations of this 
scenario for the various shocks for each crop and for each time period but report the mean value 
of these outcomes.  
In the second scenario, the inelastic scenario, we assume a narrower range for elasticities, 
which is on average more inelastic compared to the baseline scenario and follows Gardner [24]. 
This scenario further differs from the baseline in that we employ a demand specification that 
does not include income. The reason for excluding income is that some of the elasticities 




Table 5. Sources of data 
Data   Source  
Production, consumption and stocks 
in each region  
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Production, Supply 
and Distribution Data base (1)   
Domestic price of grains, sugar and 
oilseeds  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) (2)   
World energy price   International Monetary Fund Primary Commodity 
Prices (3)  
Biofuel production and consumption   Renewable Fuels Association (4)   
Exchange rates   U.S. Federal Reserve Statistical Database (5)  
Price and income elasticities of 
supply and demand for crops  
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
Elasticity Database and USDA elasticity database (6)   
 
1.  http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline  
2.  http://faostat.fao.org/  
3.  http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp  
4.  http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/#E  
5.  http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5A/  
6.  http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/tools/outlook.aspx    
Finally, to test the robustness of the inventory  demand parameters, we simulate a fourth 
scenario using Carter et al.’s estimates for the inventory demand function as opposed to our 
own. Note that different from us, Carter et al. [14] estimate the inventory demand based on 
U.S. data for 2006 through 2008, while we use world data for 2001 through 2008.  
 
6.7. Sources of data 
The various data sources are shown in Table 5. Data on production, consumption, beginning 
and ending stocks, imports, and exports for each region are obtained from the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture’s Production, Supply and Distribution database. Data on crop prices within each 
region are obtained from the FAO database. A key set of parameters in simulation models is the 
elasticities of crop supply and crop demand. Our specification of supply and demand requires 
information on elasticities of supply and demand with respect to own-price elasticities of 
supply and demand with respect to energy price and the income elasticity of demand. The 
range of elasticities contained in FAPRI database and in the literature cited by the USDA 




We report two different price changes:  
1.  Reduction of commodity price if key variables would have stayed at their 2001 levels, 
     . Technically, it is the percentage difference between the actual price in a given year and 
the counter-factual price for the same year, and  
2.  The increase of the commodity price attributed to a change in one of the variables 
(income, biofuel mandate, exchange rate , energy prices) between 2001 and the specific year, 
           ,  where                                                             . 
Technically, it is the percentage difference between counter-factual price for a given year and 
the price in 2001.  
The simulations compute      . We then compute            as follows: let    
  denote the 
total percentage price change between the year   and year 2001; then,  
                            
      
    (21) 
Total change in price from year   to year 2001 that is explained by our model equals the sum 
of            over all the shocks. The figures depict       – namely, the food commodity price 
reduction attributed to a shock that eliminates one of the factors that caused prices to change 
after 2001, whereas the tables show            – namely, the increase in commodity prices 
from 2001 attributed to one of the factors that caused prices to change after 2001. In both cases 
we report the mean outcome of 100 simulations, where for each run we draw a number from a 
range  of  plausible  values  (for  price,  income,  and  supply  elasticities)  and  compute  the 
counterfactual outcome. When presenting prices for different crops, we distinguish between 
two  different  specifications:  one  with  inventory  demand  function  and  another  without 
inventory demand. For each crop, we show the impact of these shocks one at a time.  
The  analysis  includes  five  simulated  scenarios  for  each  of  the  five  crops,  namely,  corn, 
soybeans,  rapeseed,  rice,  and  wheat.  The  baseline  scenario’s  outcome  is  contrasted  with 
alternative  specifications  to  evaluate  robustness  of  the  relative  and  absolute  value  of  the 
numerous shocks. The alternative scenarios illustrate the robustness of the results presented 
with respect to relative impact, but the absolute impact usually becomes larger as elasticities 
become smaller. Some but not all scenarios include an income term in the demand specification 41 
 
for food and feed. Introducing an income term reduces the biofuel impact. While for the first 
four scenarios we estimated an inventory demand function, for the fifth scenario, we borrowed 
the parameters from Carter et al. [14]. The estimated parameters suggest, on average, more 
elastic inventory demand, and thus less fluctuation in prices. We conclude this section by 
qualitatively  discussing  the  role  of  trade  policy  and  speculation  and  role  of  inventory 
management for limiting the impact of future shocks.  
We begin this section by presenting the results of the baseline scenario.  
 
7.1. The baseline scenario 
The observed prices for the different crops are shown in Figure 18. A clear upward trend, on 
average, emerges for all crops, albeit some prices increase more than others. Whereas the price 
of corn and soybeans increased from 2002 to 2006 by about 63%, the price of wheat increased 
by more than 74%. Furthermore, while some crops like rice and wheat experienced an upward 
trend throughout the period, others such as soybeans declined in 2005 and 2006 only to 
increase by 39% in 2007.   
  
Figure 18. Average (actual) annual prices (in US 2005 $ per tonne) 
Inventory theory predicts that prices decline when inventory accumulates, and vice versa. The 
data confirm these predictions, except for soybeans, and show similar trends for stock-to-use 
ratio (see figures 19 and 20). If, however, we drop 2007 (a year where soybean prices spiked), 
then such a pattern is also observed for soybeans.   42 
 
  
Figure 19. Inventory trends for various crops 
  
Figure 20. Crop prices and the stock-to-use ratio 
Inventory serves as a buffer and affects prices as long as inventory levels are sufficiently large. 
However, as these levels become small, prices become more volatile and sensitive to the 
numerous specific factors affecting crop prices. We observe this relation, and less fluctuation is 
observed if inventory demand is explicitly added to the analysis. The aggregate demand curve 
becomes much more elastic for large inventory levels, and thus predicts less price volatility.  
The annual increase in corn and soybean prices is largest toward the end of the sample period 43 
 
(i.e., between 2006 and 2007). One explanation for the observed price fluctuation in corn and 
soybeans is that consumption of corn for biofuel became significant around 2006, when the 
federal government began implementing biofuel mandates. Although biofuel subsidies have 
been in effect for several decades, mandates are the main cause for the recent increase in 
biofuel production. Furthermore, land allocated to corn replaces soybean land, resulting in 
higher soybean prices (not modeled explicitly in the report, because we do not have data on 
land use). This complements the upward pressure on soybean prices attributed to biodiesel 
production. On the other hand, economic growth results in structural changes to demand in 
countries like China, where increased demand for feed led to larger demand for soybeans [66] 
(considerable growth (around 20%) between 2000 and 2008 was also observed for pork).  
Because we assume rice and wheat are not utilized for biofuels in any significant quantities, 
and since land growing rice and wheat do not generally compete with corn, sugarcane and 
oilseeds,  we  conclude  that  the  prices  of  rice  and  wheat  are  not  influenced  by  biofuels. 
However,  a  general  equilibrium  framework,  in  contrast  to  the  multi-market  framework 
presented here, may identify indirect linkages between biofuel production and rice and wheat 
[47].  
When the market for storage is excluded, higher price fluctuations are documented (figures 21 
and Table 6). We plotted the standard deviation of prices for five crops for a represented shock, 
and show that the shock caused prices to fluctuate more when inventory is not modeled 
explicitly. This picture emerges for all shocks. Inventory specification matters.  
Introducing inventory demand alters outcomes. Then, because we do observe inventories and 
introducing  inventory  to  the  numerical  model  makes  a  difference,  we  focus  below  on 
simulations with inventory demand.  
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Table 6. Contribution of various factors on increased price of selected food commodities  
(% price increase from counterfactual scenario in a given year)   
  With inventory   Without inventory   
  Year   Year   
Crop   2005   2006   2007   2005   2006   2007   
Biofuel shock   
Corn   4.4%   6.8%   9.8%   5.5%   7.4%   9.8%   
Soybean   1.0%   1.8%   3.4%   1.5%   2.6%   4.1%   
Rice   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   
Wheat   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%   
Income shock   
Corn   7.9%   12.2%   15.3%   12.4%   16.7%   19.5%   
Soybean   6.3%   8.9%   14.7%   12.1%   15.6%   22.1%   
Rice   11.6%   13.5%   16.1%   20.9%   27.9%   35.1%   
Wheat   11.1%   16.0%   21.2%   15.1%   21.4%   27.7%   
Exchange rate shock   
Corn   3.5%   5.0%   7.6%   4.6%   6.2%   9.4%   
Soybean   1.0%   2.4%   5.3%   1.4%   3.8%   7.9%   
Rice   3.3%   4.0%   6.5%   6.7%   8.3%   14.4%   
Wheat   6.6%   7.3%   11.0%   8.1%   8.9%   13.1%   
Energy price shock   
Corn   2.2%   2.9%   2.9%   3.3%   3.6%   3.6%   
Soybean   1.9%   2.4%   2.4%   3.6%   4.0%   4.0%   
Rice   3.0%   3.0%   3.0%   2.4%   2.6%   2.6%   
Wheat   2.8%   3.1%   3.1%   3.6%   4.0%   4.0%   
Aggregate effect of all four shocks   
Corn   18%   27%   36%   26%   34%   42%   
Soybean   10%   15%   26%   19%   26%   38%   
Rice   18%   20%   26%   30%   39%   52%   
Wheat   20%   26%   35%   27%   34%   45%   
 
  
Figure 21. The implication of demand and supply shocks on prices with and without inventory 45 
 
7.2. Decomposing the change in crop prices 
Decomposing  changes  in  crop  prices  involves  numerous  factors,  some  affecting  demand 
whereas some affect supply. We limit our analysis to four such factors; namely, biofuel, 
income, exchange rate, and energy prices. Other factors that need to be considered, but are 
outside the scope of this work, are productivity shocks, trade policy, and speculation. We 
report below the change in prices (due to the shocks) in a certain year compared to actual or 
observed prices in that same year.  
 
7.2.1. Corn 
The results of four different shocks, applied one at a time for the period 2002-2007, are 
depicted in Figure 22. In particular, the figure presents the decline in the price of corn, if 
demand for corn did not grow because of the GNP growth, biofuel was not mandated, energy 
prices did not increase, and the US$ was not devalue. Note that the results in table 6, and 
different from the figures, project the inverse relationship, the increase in food commodity 
price  because  of  economic  growth,  introduction  of  biofuel,  higher  energy  prices  and  the 
depreciation of the US$. Throughout the text, as mentioned above, the figures and the tables 
present the results of our simulated scenarios from two vantage points. The table shows the 
price increase because of a change in factor i (i.e.,           ), whereas the figures represent the 
price reduction if the observed change in factor i would not have happened (i.e.,      ) – 
equation (21) shows the relation between            and      .   
Two dominant factors affect corn prices: The introduction of biofuels and economic growth 
(see Figure 22 and Table 6). Whereas in the absence of an increase in demand for corn, prices 
would have been 15% lower in 2007, prices would have been 10% lower without the increase 
in biofuel production (Table 6). If we ignore the fact that the co-product of corn ethanol 
production, namely, distillers grains, is a substitute for corn, then biofuels appropriate a larger 
quantity of corn that is traditionally consumed as feed and, as a result, become responsible for 
about 12% of the price increase in 2007. The single largest use of corn is feed grain for animals, 
which is used for meat and dairy. Furthermore, meat consumption tends to increase with 
income, resulting in higher demand for corn in emerging economies. As per FAO statistics, in 
China, which witnessed average growth rate of 8.5% between 1990 and 2003, per capita meat 
consumption increased 150% from approximately 20 kg per person per year in the year 1985, 
to approximately 50 kg per person per year by the year 2000. Furthermore, increase in per 46 
 
capita meat consumption should be expected not only in China but worldwide due to economic 
growth.  
The depreciation of the US$ resulted in corn prices increasing by 7%. The US$ depreciated 
relative to major currencies around the world, suggesting prices in local currency around the 
world declined all else equal, shifting demand up and to the left.  
  
Figure 22. Impact of shocks on corn prices (simulated) 
Finally, introducing inventory demand to corn markets affects the price dynamics of corn 
prices and lowers price volatility. Using Analysis of Variance techniques (ANOVA), we tested 
the hypothesis that introducing an inventory demand function does not affect corn prices. We 
reject this hypothesis at a 1% significant level and conclude that the path of corn prices 
between 2002 and 2007, when an inventory demand function is included, is different than the 
path observed if, instead, such a function is not included (i.e., the between p-value is less than 
1%). Moreover, the variance in prices is larger when inventory demand is not introduced. We 
conclude that not introducing demand for inventory overestimates the price fluctuation of corn 
(Figure 21).  
Using equation (21), we find that biofuels contributed 19.8% to the increase in corn price in 
2007 relative to 2001, income shock contributed 29.6%, exchange rate shocks contributed 
15.81%, and energy shocks contributed at least 10.8%.  
 
7.2.2. Soybeans 
Soybean  prices  are  affected  primarily  by  the  increase  in  demand  due  to  economic 
growth. The increase in income that led to increased demand, contributed more than 15% to 47 
 
the soybean price spike in 2007 (Table 6). The impact of biofuel is smaller than that for corn 
and is about 4%. Similar to corn, the single largest use of soybean is feed for livestock and 
poultry, which has witnessed rapid growth in demand due to economic growth. The reduction 
of soybean prices, when key factors would have stayed at their 2001 levels, is shown in Figure 
23.   
  
Figure 23. Impact of shocks on soy prices (simulated) 
The relation between inventory and soybean prices is similar to the one identified with respect 
to corn prices (with the exception of 2007). The analysis suggests that inventory demand is 
statistically different from a model with no inventory demand at a 1% significant level (i.e., the 
between p-value is 1%).  
Using equation (21), we find that biofuels contributed 7.4% to the increase in soybean price in 
2007 relative to 2001, income shocks contributed 28.6%, exchange rate shocks contributed 
11.2%, and energy shocks contributed at least 10.0%.  
 
7.2.3. Rice 
In our model, rice production and consumption are not affected by biofuel. Therefore, we do 
not model a biofuel shock but concentrate on the income, exchange rate, and energy prices 
shocks (Figure 24).  
Rice prices are affected by the income shock, which contributes 14% to the price increase in 
2007 (figure 24). The price dynamics can be explained by the fact that rice is mostly consumed 
in the fastest growing economies in the world such as China, India, Indonesia, and several 48 
 
countries in South and Southeast Asia. China, India, and Indonesia account for 36.8%, 23.2%, 
and 10.1% of world rice consumption, respectively.  
Rice is the dominant staple food crop in developing countries, particularly for the humid 
tropics across the globe. Almost 90% of rice is produced and consumed in Asia, and 96% in 
developing countries. Most of the growth in production originated from technological progress 
in the irrigated and favorable rainfed ecosystems.  
  
Figure 24. Impact of shocks on rice prices (simulated) 
Some argue that rice is an inferior good, implying that the specification under the baseline 
scenario is flawed—the income elasticity should be negative not positive. We address this in 
the inelastic scenario where no income effect was assumed.  
The rate of growth in rice consumption has started slowing down because of urbanization and 
increases in per capita income leading to diversification of the diet,
12 high levels of rice 
consumption already reached in many countries, and progress in reducing population growth. 
But, the growth in rice supply has also slowed down because of the yield -approaching 
economic maximum for the irrigated ecosystem,  decline in relative profitability of rice 
cultivation, increasing concerns regarding environmental protection, and limited progress in 
developing improved technologies for the unfavorable ecosystems. Trade policy also had its 
share (e.g., India in 2008).  
Two contrasting developments may substantially affect the rice economy in the future. First, 
the prosperous rice-growing countries may increasingly find it difficult to sustain producers’ 




interest in rice farming. 
The move towards free trade in agricultural production begun with the Uruguay Round of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), will affect the sustainability of rice farming 
in these countries. There will be economic incentives for the movement of land, water, and 
labor out of rice to other economic activities. Second, the potential for increased productivity 
for the irrigated ecosystem, created by the dramatic technological breakthrough in genetic 
enhancement of seeds that initiated the green revolution, has almost been exploited, while 
improved varieties for the unfavorable ecosystems expected from the ongoing gene revolution 
are still on the horizon. As such, the worldwide situation with genetically modified (GM)rice is 
basically development as opposed to distribution—the problem is not regulatory constraints on 
distribution but lack of varieties with required traits.
13 Currently, several dozen varieties of 
GM rice are underdeveloped or are undergoing field testing. Between 1982 and 1997, 160 
patents were granted or pending. In 2001, the mapping of the rice genome was completed, 
spurring further GM development.  
In the absence of exchange rate shock, rice price would have been 6% lower from the actual 
price observed in 2007 (Figure 24). Although China is the largest rice producer (its share in 
global rice production is approximately 33%), and its currency only margina lly fluctuates 
relative to the US$, many other countries that produce rice saw their currency strengthen 
relative to the US$.  
In response to rising food prices, different countries adopted a range of different short -term 
measures. An FAO report [ 17] classifies these measures into three main groups, namely, 
trade-oriented  policies  such  as  reducing  import  tariffs  and   export  restrictions, 
consumer-oriented  policies  such  as  food  subsidies  price  controls  and  policies  reducing 
inventory,  and  thirdly,  producer -oriented  policies  such  as  input  subsidies.  Based  on 
information obtained from 81 countries, they report the two most widely applied measures are 
reduction of tariffs, as reported by 43 countries, and releasing grain from public stocks, as 
reported by 35 countries. While tariff reductions are easy to implement, the efficacy of the 
latter policy depends on the level of reserves. In an attempt to shore up domestic supply, 
several major grain-exporting nations also imposed export restrictions and in some cases 
banned them altogether in response to the food price inflation. Examples of nations with such 
restrictions include Argentina, Cambodia, China, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, 
Ukraine, and Vietnam. However, world prices escalated as a result of su ch restrictions. The 
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most severe impact of export restrictions has been on world rice market, which is traditionally 
thin in trade. In our report, the impact of trade policy restrictions are indirectly captured 
through exchange rate shocks, and magnifies the impact of the exchange rate on rice prices.  
Energy prices contributed about 3% to the price increase. The spike in crude oil and the impact 
it had on energy prices caused prices to increase albeit only by a few percentage points.  
Explicit  consideration  of  storage  demand  has  a  statistically  significant  effect  on  model 
predictions for rice. Similar to corn and soybeans, we reject the hypothesis that the dynamic 
price path of rice with an inventory demand function is not different from a model without an 
inventory demand function.  
Using equation (21), we find that income shock contributed 29.6% to the increase in rice price 
in  2007  relative  to  2001,  exchange  rate  shocks  contributed  13.0%,  and  energy  shocks 
contributed at least 6.7%.  
  
7.2.4. Wheat 
The main contributor to the increase in the price of wheat is the demand shock. In 2007 
world production of wheat was 607 million tons, making it the third most-produced cereal after 
maize (784 million tons) and rice (651 million tons). Wheat also supplies much of the world’s 
dietary protein and food supply, with China consuming in 2007 nearly 30% of global wheat 
consumption. Therefore, the impact of an income shock dominates the other effects (figure 25). 
It contributed more than 21% to the increase in wheat prices during 2007 (Table 6 and Figure 
25).   
The depreciation of the US$ resulted in wheat prices being 10% higher. Finally, and similar to 
other crops, we reject the hypothesis that price dynamics does not depend on inventory at a 1% 
significant level.  
Using equation (21), we find that income shock contributed 34.4% to the increase in wheat 
price in 2007 relative to 2001, exchange rate shocks contributed 19.5%, and energy shocks 
contributed at least 8.6%.  
As pointed out above, although biofuel is an important factor contributing to the price spike, 
demand growth due to income and probably population growth is the main factor.  Other 
scholars have also arrived at the conclusion that demand growth is a key factor affecting food 
prices. Employing a partial equilibrium framework, Subramanian and Deaton [63] argued that 51 
 
demand  shifters  played  a  crucial  role  in  explaining  food  prices,  while  Alston  et  al.  [4] 
commented that in the absence of an increase in productivity food prices should rise.  
  
Figure 25. Impact of shocks on wheat prices (simulated) 
The study by Baffes and Haniotis [7] suggests that the role of demand is not as prominent, 
because low level of growth in consumption during the investigated period – especially of 
wheat and rice. However, changes in consumption are different than changes in demand. 
Growth in income and population, coupled with high-income elasticity, contributed to the 
increase in demand. Yet, production did not grow much, especially in the case of wheat and 
rice. So the growth in supply was modest, leading to a modest increase in consumption but a 
large increase in price. The rate of growth in consumption of soybean and corn was higher than 
wheat and rice, reflecting larger productivity gains (Sexton et al. 2009). But as income grew, 
demand for meat and thus demand for feed grew as well, resulting in an increase in prices and 
reduction of inventories. Thus, economic growth is an important contributor to the rise in food 
commodity prices. The study by Baffes and Haniotis also emphasizes the role of commodities 
by financial investors in 2007/08 food commodity price spike, which we did not investigate.  
The baseline model explains the fluctuation in prices. It captures the effect of biofuel, income 
growth, energy prices, and exchange rate on food commodity prices. The report does not 
introduce population growth, speculation, and trade policy, as well as supply factors such as 
productivity growth and weather shocks to the analysis. Having said that, we next calculate 
how  much  of  the  total  price  change  the  simulation  explains,  correcting  for  yield  effects 
reported in the literature [4]. Supply shift due to yield increase reduced upward pressure 
exerted by the increase in demand. Thus, we use the slope of the supply function, and assume 52 
 
annual yield growth of 1.5% shifts supply to the right, and compute        , i.e., line segment 
   in Figure 26. Then, the amount explained by our model is simply  
                   
   
    
             
 
where                   is  the  sum  of  the  price  change  explained  by  the  different  shocks 
(                                                          ), and recall that     
  is  the 
price change observed between period t and     , i.e., line segment    in Figure 26. Table 7 
shows the total explained price increase with respect to 2001.   
  
Figure 26. Total explained price change 
The amount of the price fluctuation explained by our model is different for different crops, in 
part because the omitted factors affect some crops more than others. For instance, we did not 
add trade policy shocks, which affected rice, and we do not have weather shocks, which 
adversely affected wheat.  
Table 7. Total percent price change in 2007 explained by numerical model 
% explained   With respect to 2001   
Corn   70%   
Soybean   55%   
Rice   47%   
Wheat   54%   
 
7.3. Sensitivity analysis 





















for inventory, are challenging but are key step to accurately measuring the factors causing the 
food inflation of 2007-08, two additional scenarios were numerically simulated to further 
check the robustness of our conclusion. 
7.3.1. Inelastic scenario 
Key parameters in our analysis and in simulation-based models in general are the elasticities, 
which are used to  calibrate the demand and supply curves.  The  alternative specification, 
denoted the inelastic scenario, assumes lower elasticities. The elasticities used in the baseline 
scenario were obtained from well-known and widely used sources such as the FAPRI elasticity 
database and the USDA elasticity database.
14 However, according to several other researchers, 
the elasticities of supply and demand for agriculture are more inelastic than those reported in 
the above databases (For instance, see Gardner [ 24] for a discussion of supply and demand 
elasticities for agricultural commodities). In order that the elasticities are on average lower than 
those in the baseline scenario and also conservative, we chose own-price supply elasticities in 
the range 0.2 to 0.3 and own- price demand elasticities in the range -0.3 to -0.2. Employing 
these elasticities, we find that the main qualitative conclusions regarding the importance of the 
different shocks from the baseline scenario hold.
15 
Comparing  the  baseline  scenario  to  the  inelastic  scenario  results  in  the  price  changes 
summarized in Table  8. This comparison emphasizes the importance of obtaining good 
elasticity estimates. Elasticity matters, and the more inelastic scenario result in a larger impact.  
   
                                                 
14http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/InternationalFoodDemand/ 
15To this end, using world data on four major crops, namely, corn, soybeans, wheat, and rice from 1960 to 2007, Roberts and 
Schlenker estimate that short-term, own-price elasticity of supply and demand for calories from these crops is less than 0.15 
and greater than -0.1, respectively [58]. 54 
 
Table 8. Comparison of results between main and sensitivity analysis (% change as compared to the 
counterfactual scenario in 2007) 
Shock   Crop   Main Analysis   Sensitivity analysis  
Biofuel   Corn   9.8%   12.7%  
  Soybean   3.4%   3.7%  
Income growth   Corn   15.3%   20.3%  
  Soybean   14.7%   16.0%  
  Rice   16.1%   17.2%  
  Wheat   21.1%   25.8%  
 
7.3.2. Price effect of shocks using inventory specification of Carter et al. [14]. 
 
Finally, we simulate the model using the inventory demand parameters estimated in Carter et 
al. [14]. Results confirm the conclusions derived for the baseline scenario. The price effect now 
is marginally smaller for all shocks. This is because the estimates of the parameters of the 
inventory demand employed in the elastic scenario imply an inventory demand function that is 
on average more elastic compared to that suggested by parameters estimated by Carter et al.  
8. Conclusion 
 
This  report  has  focused  on  four  major  factors  widely  agreed  to  be  responsible  for  food 
commodity price increases – economic growth, biofuel expansion, exchange rate fluctuations, 
and  energy  price  change.  The  study  also  captures  the  effect  of  inventory  adjustments. 
Incorporating an empirically estimated inventory demand function into the market-clearing 
condition shows that the impact of inventory on prices increases as the level of inventory 
diminishes. We find that in the absence of shocks attributable to the four factors mentioned 
above, in 2007 the prices of corn, soybean, rapeseed, rice, and wheat would have been 26% to 
36% lower than the observed prices in that year. On the other hand, if inventory demand were 
to be ignored, in 2007 the prices would have been 38% to 52% lower than the observed prices 
in that year. Abstracting from considerations of inventory responses leads to predictions of 
larger price changes.  55 
 
Because key parameters in our analysis are the elasticities which are used to calibrate the 
demand and supply curves, we performed several sensitivity analyses on these values. In these 
alternative scenarios we introduced more inelastic curves and compared our results to those 
obtained if, instead of our estimated inventory parameters, we used the inventory parameters 
from Carter et al. [14]. We conclude that although the percentage changes vary between 
scenarios, the main conclusion that inventory matters does not change. The relative magnitude 
of the various shocks also does not change.  
From a policy standpoint,  the food crisis  emphasizes both  the importance of a proactive 
inventory management policy, and the need for mechanisms that either compensate the poor 
when prices rise to abnormally high levels or more directly mitigate spikes in food prices. Such 
mechanisms may include biofuel mandates that adjust automatically to the situation in food 
markets, as well as inventory management policies. Expanding agricultural supply through 
investment in research and development, and introducing policies that would allow more 
effective  utilization  of  existing  technologies  as  well  as  investment  in  outreach  and 
infrastructure that will enhance productivity, also reduce the likelihood of a food price spike.  
One limitation of this paper is that some important crop-specific factors, such as weather and 
productivity shocks (especially for wheat) and trade policies (especially for rice), are not 
considered.  Another  factor  not  considered  in  this  report  is  speculation.  The  reasons  for 
exclusion of these factors are data as well as model limitations. Another limitation is that we 
looked  at  each  market  separately,  rather  than  in  an  integrated  manner.  No  cross-price 
elasticities were introduced, which may lead us to underestimate the impact of the different 
factors on prices.  
Although our conclusions are robust to a broad range of assumptions about the price elasticity 
of supply and demand for crops and parameters of the inventory demand function, an important 
area of future work is the empirical estimation of these parameters. Identifying correctly the 
inventory demand curve is a challenge, and is a key step to accurately measuring the factors 
causing the food inflation of 2007-08. In future work we plan to further investigate these 
relationships, and to introduce cross- price elasticities. Moreover, the study does not cover the 
2008-2010 period, which was characterized by strong commodity price volatility. Thus, a 
further  study  is  imperative  to  generate  more  policy  insights  by  extending  this  study, 
incorporating the factors excluded here and also covering the 2008-2010 period.  
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